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Introduction 
 
Piers Ludlow 
 
 
 
European integration and the cold war have both played a significant role in shaping the 
evolution of Europe since the Second World War.  Each, in their own different ways, did 
much to divide Europe and to unify it.  The integration process has from the outset drawn 
a sharp dividing line between those countries which chose to participate in the ‘building 
of Europe’ and those which did not.  It also created strong bonds, economic, political and 
institutional, between the six, then nine, ten, twelve, fifteen and now twenty five 
countries which have been involved.  Likewise the cold war underlined not merely the 
sharp distinction between Eastern and Western Europe, between the communist and free 
worlds, but also a less clear cut but still important fracture between those European 
countries which belonged to one bloc or the other and those neutrals which remained 
detached from the East-West conflict.  The cold war too had a strong unifying effect, 
establishing lasting ties between the countries of each cold war alliance and making much 
more solid and enduring the interconnections between Western Europe and the 
undisputed leader of the Western world, the United States.  Both processes, moreover, 
were born, or at least institutionalised, in the same crucial five years immediately after 
the end of the Second World War.  And both were profoundly marked by many of the 
political heavy-weights of the post-war period.  Ernest Bevin, Robert Schuman, Konrad 
Adenauer, Charles de Gaulle, Paul-Henri Spaak, Dwight Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles 
or John F. Kennedy feature prominently in most accounts of both the integration of 
Europe and the development of Western Europe during the cold war. 
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 Surprisingly, however, the history of each has tended to be studied and told with 
next no reference to the other.  Much has thus been written about Western Europe and the 
early cold war.1  And an almost equal amount of ink has been spilled in attempts to 
analyse the origins and early development of the European integration process.2  But 
these two historiographies have tended to develop in parallel with few obvious points of 
intersection.  Cold war historians have thus focused their attention on a narrative which 
stretches from the establishment of the blocs in the 1940s, through the high tension and 
confrontation of the 1950s and early 1960s, the détente of the later 1960s and 1970s, the 
‘second cold war’ of the early 1980s and the final collapse of the cold war system and of 
the Soviet bloc in 1989-90.  Historians of European integration meanwhile have refined a 
story in which the frustrated hopes of those aspiring to European unity in the 1940s were 
partially realised in the early 1950s, hard hit by the collapse of the putative European 
Defence Community (EDC) in 1954, dramatically revived in 1955 with the Messina 
conference and the start of the negotiations which were to lead to the creation of the 
European Economic Community (EEC), consolidated by the Community’s early success, 
depressed by the stagnation of the process during the 1970s and early 1980s, and revived 
once more by the renewed surge forward of the integration process in the mid to late 
1980s.  These twin tales, moreover, have been expounded, debated, and critiqued in 
different journals and at different conferences.3  And they have been introduced to 
students in simplified form in separate textbooks designed for separate university 
courses.4 
 There are admittedly some partial exceptions to this rule.  The most obvious, 
perhaps, is constituted by some of the writing on the late 1940s and early 1950s.  
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Analysts of the Marshall Plan, for instance, have been able to point out that the European 
Recovery Programme was not simply a cold war mile-stone and a crucial step towards 
the formation of a solidly western US-led bloc, but also a policy initiative intended by its 
creators to foster European unity and to encourage the economic integration of Western 
Europe.5  Likewise, studies of the EDC have seldom been able to ignore its cold war 
origins – it was born in response to the outbreak of the Korean War and the increased 
urgency which this gave to the issue of whether or nor West Germany should be allowed 
to rearm – or to overlook the enormous energy with which the United States championed 
the project as both a crucial step towards strengthening Western Europe’s defences 
against the Soviet threat and as major advance in the direction of that European unity for 
which the US had called since 1947.6   Revealingly, however, both of these examples of 
cold war and integration cross-over are normally regarded as failures.  Thus most 
European historians, at least, would view the Marshall Plan as a major economic success 
and as vital in establishing the Western bloc, but as something of a flop as far as 
European unity is concerned.  US attempts to force the recipients of Marshall Aid to 
submit a single pan-European wish-list rather than multiple national requests or to accept 
the appointment of a heavy-weight secretary general of the Organisation for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC) able to bang heads together and oblige the different 
countries to cooperate, were systematically thwarted by European resistance.7  Over time 
the Marshall Plan thus did more to cement bilateral links between Washington and each 
of the major European capitals than it did to nurture multilateral European cooperation.  
And the institutions that were born out of the Marshall Plan – notably the OEEC – came 
to be regarded by many of those responsible for establishing the European Coal and Steel 
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Community (ECSC) or the EEC as examples of how not to integrate and as the archetype 
of ineffective intergovernmental structures doomed to paralysis.8  Similarly, the EDC 
became European integration’s most celebrated failure – the project that momentarily 
threatened to bury the whole endeavour.9  Here too, therefore, enthusiastic American 
backing seemed to have been in vain and possibly even counter-productive.  Dulles’ 
celebrated threat that the rejection of the EDC might trigger ‘an agonising reappraisal’ of 
the US commitment to Europe proved totally futile with French parliamentarians 
choosing to call his bluff and vote down the ambitious treaty in August 1954.  Overall, 
therefore, even the two main exceptions to the normally separate narratives of integration 
and the cold war in Europe seem only to justify the normal detachment between the two 
fields.  For on the rare occasions where the two did interconnect, cold war inspired US 
pressure led the integration process astray and failed to have a lasting impact.  European 
integration, the implication seems to be, has worked only when it has been carried out by 
Europeans for European reasons rather than when it has been foist upon Western Europe 
by a well-meaning but over-enthusiastic superpower. 
 The gulf between the two fields has only been increased by recent trends in the 
historiography of both European integration history and cold war history.  The former, 
for instance, has been deeply marked by the emphasis placed by Alan Milward and his 
followers on the economic causes of the integration process.  The notion that ECSC was 
the product of a particular crisis in the French steel industry, or that the EEC constituted a 
Dutch-inspired attempt to rescue the European nation state by consolidating and making 
irreversible the intra-European trade boom of the 1950s, left little space for cold war 
considerations.10  The ‘cold war’ indeed does not register in the index of either of 
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Milward’s influential two volumes on the origins of European integration.11  Likewise, 
the proliferation of detailed archivally-based studies of each individual country’s path to 
the EEC has also tended to lessen the emphasis on the cold war as a motivation.  For the 
central figures of many of these new studies have been national civil servants, often 
based in either economic ministries or those portions of the foreign ministry most 
concerned with commercial affairs, who were much less involved professionally with the 
parallel evolution of the cold war than were the statesmen and parliamentarians who 
populated earlier, less detailed, accounts of integration’s origins.12  Cold war historians, 
meanwhile, have responded in kind.   Over the last two decades there has been a fairly 
systematic attempt to demonstrate that the Western European powers did matter in a cold 
war context and that events were not entirely determined by the superpowers.13  But 
much of this emphasis on the power or even tyranny of the weak has concentrated on the 
way individual European states were able to manipulate and use Washington to their own 
ends.14  The emphasis has thus been bilateral and transatlantic rather than multilateral and 
pan-European.  With a few honourable exceptions, neither ‘new cold war history’ nor the 
most recent writings of integration experts have broken the pattern described above; 
many of its products have if anything made the separation more acute.15 
 This volume and the conference at Pembroke College, Oxford out of which it 
emerged were designed to examine these parallel histories and to begin to assess whether 
or not their lack of interconnection was justified.  Those invited to participate were 
historians who had shown interest in either cold war history or European integration 
history or occasionally both.  Indeed several of those who attended belonged to that 
comparatively rare breed of scholar who had published about both fields, although 
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revealing even they had most often done so in different volumes and in different articles 
rather than in single works.16  The players on which they concentrated – France, West 
Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, the United States and the Community institutions - 
were those deemed most likely to have had significant roles in both the cold war and the 
European integration process.  And the period upon which they were invited to focus – 
the second half of the 1960s and the early 1970s - was one of some importance to both 
the development of European integration and the cold war, but equally one where the 
interconnections between the two fields had not previously been explored.  It therefore 
constitutes a good testing ground for the hypothesis that the separation between cold war 
and European integration history described above was artificial and too extreme. 
 The 1960s were an important period in the development of Western Europe.  
Economically, the period was one during which the continent’s remarkable post-war rise 
seemed to continue.17  There were a few minor interruptions.  And the relatively sluggish 
British economy went on defying the wider trend.  Overall, however, the period was one 
of high growth rates, booming exports, minimal unemployment and controllable inflation 
– a performance that did much to cement in the minds of Western European policy-
makers and citizens an equation between European integration and economic success that 
would be largely absent from those countries like Britain that were only to join the EEC 
in 1973, the very year that the economic bubble burst.  Politically, meanwhile, the 
gradual rise of the political left after the dominance across Western Europe of the centre-
right during the 1950s seemed to be occurring in a controlled and unthreatening manner – 
until 1968 at least.  And in international terms, the rapid liquidation in the early 1960s of 
Western Europe’s remaining colonial empires, meant that Britain, France, Belgium and 
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the Netherlands no longer found themselves besieged by world opinion and liable to 
criticism even from their superpower ally about their imperial policies in the way that had 
been the case throughout the latter half of the 1950s.   The speed and dignity with which 
each power left its former Asian, African and Caribbean holdings varied significantly – 
but in all of the European colonial powers the sense of relief at the end of empire seemed 
to outweigh any regret for diminished international influence.   Indeed Gaullist France 
was probably not unique in believing that it could operate more effectively on the world 
stage after it had lost its empire than it had been able to when it still ruled directly over 
significant portions of Africa and South-East Asia.18 
 Western Europe’s renewed self-confidence – fuelled by its economic success and 
facilitated by colonial disengagement – did not however correspond to increased 
centrality to global affairs.  From a cold war history perspective the 1960s are the decade 
when the centre of gravity of cold war confrontation shifted most decisively away from 
Europe and towards the Third World.  This reflected the fact that, while the European 
status quo was comparatively stable – Trachtenberg talks of a European settlement 
having been reached by 196319 – the battle over the international alignment of the newly 
independent states of Asia and Africa had only just been joined.20  The way in which 
headlines and news reports about the situation in Vietnam or the state of Sino-Soviet 
relations had all but replaced bulletins from Berlin or anxious speculation about the fate 
of Trieste as the main daily reminders of the ongoing cold war accurately symbolised the 
change.  Likewise the manner in which the one clear cold war crisis which did occur in 
Europe in the latter half of the 1960s – the crushing of the Prague Spring in August 1968 
– was not allowed by either East or West to interrupt more than momentarily the slow 
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progress of détente, demonstrates the extent to which each bloc had accepted, de facto if 
not de jure, the presence and the geographical limits of the other.21 
 To a large extent this stabilisation of the European cold war front was good news 
for Western Europe.  The fading fear of Soviet invasion or subversion certainly 
contributed to that sense of growing confidence and well-being noted above.  But it also 
significantly reduced the pressure on each European country to march in tight formation 
behind the United States as far as their international policy was concerned.  By the mid-
1960s not only had the countries of Western Europe long since rid themselves of that 
financial dependence on the US which had characterised the early cold war but they were 
also self-confident enough to feel that they could each devise their own distinctive 
approach to East-West relations.  This allowed the diversity of national approaches which 
will be analysed in the chapters that follow.  And it also carried with it the potential that 
disagreements over cold war policy could spill over and interconnect with that other key 
area of intercourse between European countries, namely the development of the EEC.  
Dissension in NATO might, in other words, contaminate the successful process of 
European integration thereby endangering Western cooperation over much more than just 
military or security matters. 
 The opening two chapters of the volume focus on France – the first western 
country to break ranks significantly in its approach to the cold war.   Georges-Henri 
Soutou thus sets out to contrast the European and cold war policies of the two French 
Presidents to occupy the Elysée during the 1965-73 period, namely Charles de Gaulle and 
Georges Pompidou.  Both Presidents were supposedly Gaullist.  Pompidou indeed won 
the 1969 elections partly by presenting himself as the candidate of continuity after the de 
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Gaulle’s surprise resignation earlier that year.22  But as Soutou demonstrates each had 
very different approaches to the cold war, to European integration, and to the 
interconnections between the two.  Thus while de Gaulle’s whole strategy centred upon a 
belief that the cold war division of Europe could be overcome and that the Soviet Union 
(or Russia as he preferred to call it) could be re-integrated into a pan-European system, 
Pompidou’s vision was much more cautious as far as East-West relations were 
concerned.  This underlying strategic gulf meant that each then turned towards greater 
Western European cooperation (although neither liked integration as such) in radically 
different circumstances.  For de Gaulle it was a fall-back option to be explored most 
energetically when the prospects for détente were least encouraging – as they were in the 
early 1960s.  For Pompidou, by contrast, Western European cooperation became most 
attractive in the latter half of his presidency when détente appeared to be in danger of 
advancing too far too fast.  Closer European cooperation might give France some degree 
of control over Germany’s Eastern policies and somewhat lessen the danger of a 
superpower condominium over Europe.   
Garret Martin’s chapter, by contrast, adopts a rather different approach.  For 
instead of looking at how French policy developed over the whole of the period, he 
focuses in some detail on one crucial eight month period, from September 1967 to April 
1968.  This allows him to prove how tightly entwined were the different strands of 
French foreign policy.  Thus the mounting frustrations of French Eastern policy – which 
were ever more apparent during these months despite the seeming success of de Gaulle’s 
state visit to Poland – were closely connected to France’s growing isolation vis-à-vis its 
Western partners.  And this last was in turn accentuated by the way in which the French 
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struggled to rally Germany and the other EEC member states to its side in the ongoing 
debate about how global monetary cooperation should be organised, while at the very 
same time seeking to defy those same Community partners by blocking the British bid for 
EEC membership.  While Soutou explores the linkages between the cold war and 
European integration at the level of overall French strategy, Martin thus reveals the ways 
in which the two fields could become entangled at a tactical level. 
 In chapters three and four the focus shifts to West Germany.  The Federal 
Republic had, for understandable reasons, been the most orthodox and reliable ally 
throughout most of the early cold war years.  Both its approach to East-West relations 
and its engagement with European integration had been everything that the United States 
could have wished for during all but the last few months of the lengthy period when 
Konrad Adenuaer remained Chancellor.  Indeed, if misunderstandings or mistrust did 
arise between Washington and Bonn in this era, it was normally because Adenuaer’s 
government proved itself plus royaliste que le roi in its steadfastness towards the East 
and its enthusiasm for cooperation with the West!23  And even Adenuaer’s brief final 
flirtation with de Gaulle, which did ring alarm bells in Washington and cast momentary 
doubt over West Germany’s reliability, seemed to have been decisively ended by 
Adenauer’s successor, the ultra-loyal Atlanticist Ludwig Erhard.24  Much was to change, 
however, with the rise of Willy Brandt, initially as Foreign Minister of the Grand 
Coalition government which ruled the FRG from 1966 to 1969 and then, from September 
1969, as Chancellor of a centre-left government.  Both chapters on Germany thus centre 
their attention on the Brandt years. 
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 The chapter by Wilfried Loth focuses on the crucial relationship between the new 
German Chancellor and his French opposite number.   Theirs was not a particularly easy 
relationship: the Brandt-Pompidou pairing has not been treated with the same sort of 
retrospective reverence in the burgeoning literature on le couple franco-allemand as de 
Gaulle and Adenauer, Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing or François 
Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl.25  As Loth shows, however, they did make an effort to find 
areas where the two countries could cooperate closely and were not totally without their 
successes.  Importantly for this volume their dialogue encompassed both the evolving 
pattern of East-West relations and the question of how the early successes of the EEC 
could be built upon.  Quite a lot of their attention was therefore directed towards the 
possibility of building a more political Europe, one able to assert itself more clearly from 
the United States over foreign policy matters in general and the direction of détente in 
particular.   Ironically, though, these discussions emphasised the extent to which 
Germany and France had swapped positions by the late 1960s and early 1970s.  In the 
Brandt era it was thus Germany that put forward the radical ideas as much about 
Transatlantic relations as about the approach to Eastern Europe, while it was France that 
played the role of conservative brake on a partner prone to over-ambition.  Germany’s 
radicalism is explored still further in Andreas Wilkens’ chapter.  This traces the 
development of Ostpolitik back to Brandt’s formative years as mayor of Berlin during the 
1950s and early 1960s, before explaining how the new approach to Eastern Europe and to 
the German Democratic Republic was implemented when the Social Democrats became 
the dominant party of government in Germany in 1969.  It also explores the extent to 
which Brandt’s new Eastern policy was rooted in the earlier success of the Federal 
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Republic’s Westpolitik.  On this Wilkens suggests some interesting divergences between 
the ideas of the Chancellor and those of his closest aide and collaborator, Egon Bahr. 
 The two chapters on Britain both concentrate on the years when the United 
Kingdom found itself outside of the European Community but deeply preoccupied with 
the question of how to get in.  Helen Parr confronts the vexed question of Community 
enlargement head-on in her chapter, identifying the reasons behind Harold Wilson’s 
belated conversion to the idea of European integration and elucidating how the Labour 
government hoped to avoid its bid to enter the EEC being thwarted by de Gaulle in much 
the same manner as Harold Macmillan’s 1961 membership application had been.  
Ultimately, of course, the French President did bar Britain’s path once more.  But as Parr 
explains, the General’s second veto turned out to be a Pyrrhic veto – a short-term success 
that actually revealed more about de Gaulle’s weakness than it did about his strength.  En 
passant, Parr’s chapter also demonstrates that the question of EEC membership was one 
of the aspects of early European integration where the interconnections with the over-
arching cold war were strongest and most clear. 
 James Ellison’s chapter is somewhat more cold war centred in its focus, but again 
brings out the existence of links between the cold war and the EEC.   A study in Anglo-
American relations, the piece investigates the way in which London and Washington 
coordinated their response to de Gaulle’s March 1966 decision to withdraw France from 
NATO’s integrated military command.  Central to British and American strategies was 
their shared belief that Britain’s capacity to establish itself as a rival pole of attraction to 
France and thereby prevent the General’s actions having the detrimental effects on 
Western unity which both London and Washington feared was tightly wrapped up with 
 13 
the UK’s attitude towards the EEC.   The Wilson government’s realisation that it needed 
to revive the issue of British EEC membership and move the country closer to, and if 
possible into, the European Community was thus in part a response to the crisis in NATO 
and to the wider challenge posed by de Gaulle.  Other aspects of the same basic strategy 
involved the resolution of the long-standing question of how to give Germany some 
influence over Western nuclear strategy without allowing the Federal Republic to acquire 
nuclear weapons of its own, the settling of the acrimonious wrangle between the United 
States, Britain and Germany over the costs of allied troops stationed in Germany, and the 
public demonstration of NATO’s commitment to the pursuit of détente.  The chapter 
hence underlines both the scale of the challenge which Gaullist France was deemed to 
pose to the West and the multifaceted nature of the Anglo-American response. 
 Jan van der Harst’s contribution on Dutch foreign policy acts as a salutary 
reminder that in neither NATO nor the EEC did the larger countries have it entirely their 
own way.  The Netherlands in particular emerged as a doughty adversary of General de 
Gaulle and a determined defender of Atlanticist orthodoxy.  This reflected its profound 
belief that while European integration was economically vital to a small trading nation, 
Dutch security interests were much better looked after in a wider grouping including the 
United States and Britain than they would be in any rival European entity.  The Hague 
government was thus strongly opposed to the premature development of a coordinated 
European foreign policy – in 1962 it had played a central role in blocking the so-called 
Fouchet Plan, de Gaulle’s most systematic attempt to create such foreign policy 
coordination26 – and deeply suspicious of anything that might lessen the ties between 
Europe and the US.  In an interesting reminder, however, of the potential influence of 
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public opinion and domestic political change over foreign policy, van der Harst explains 
how several of the certainties of 1960s Dutch foreign policy were over-turned when the 
veteran foreign minister Joseph Luns was replaced in 1971 by Norbert Schmelzer.  The 
Netherlands moderated, for instance, their hard-line stance towards détente and became 
more supportive of the idea that the soon-to-be-enlarged European Community could 
acquire some involvement in the field of foreign policy coordination.  The presence of 
the British, after all, was believed likely to minimise the chances of any dangerous drift 
away from Atlantic alignment. 
 As Piers Ludlow explains in chapter eight, the Community institutions themselves 
remained somewhat detached from the cold war and the question of East-West relations 
throughout the 1960s.  Contacts were thus minimal between the European Commission 
and a Soviet bloc which still regarded the integration process as a vehicle for German 
revanchisme; the agenda of ministerial discussions in the EEC Council of Ministers 
involved little which directly impinged upon East-West relations; and there were both 
bureaucratic and tactical reasons militating against any real linkage between the EEC’s 
development and the wider cold war.  Despite this, however, the chapter maintains that 
there were a number of more indirect connections between the integration process and the 
East-West struggle.  In particular, the chapter argues that the whole environment within 
which the early Community was able to flourish was profoundly shaped by the cold war 
alliance between Europe and the United States.  As a result it is impossible fully to 
understand what went on in the Brussels institutions without being aware of parallel 
developments in the cold war. 
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 Chapter nine by Jussi Hanhimäki turns its attention to the United States.  
America’s importance in the calculations of all of the European players examined in the 
book is obvious, but as Hanhimäki reminds us Washington was less centrally concerned 
with European affairs in the late 1960s and early 1970s than it had been a decade or so 
before.  The salience of Western European affairs in American foreign policy had 
steadily diminished in a period where the key issues preoccupying US policy-makers 
were the protracted war in Vietnam, crises in the Middle East, and the exciting prospects 
of superpower détente and triangular diplomacy.  By the end of the period reviewed, the 
Watergate scandal and the domestic failings of the Nixon administration constituted an 
additional distraction.  The US did, however, remain involved in Western Europe – its 
largest trading partner as well as its main cold war ally – and was therefore in a position 
to react to de Gaulle, to co-opt Brandt’s opening to the East into its own policy of 
détente, to support the enlargement of the EEC, and to engage, albeit belatedly, with the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).  Despite a number of 
transatlantic contretemps, notably Henry Kissinger’s ill-fated attempt to designate 1973 
as the Year of Europe, the United States continued to be a key actor in Western Europe 
exercising a vital influence over both the course of East-West relations and the 
development of the EEC.  This alone added a further layer of interconnection between the 
cold war and European integration. 
 A final chapter will then bring together a number of preliminary conclusions and 
suggest a possible agenda for future research.  Much more remains to be studied in this 
field.  Serious international history writing about the late 1960s and early 1970s remains 
very much in its infancy.  And the long-standing divide between cold war history and the 
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history of European integration is too well established and too profound to be entirely 
bridged by just one edited volume.  Overall, however, there is enough in the chapters of 
this book to suggest that there were multiple points where the cold war and integration 
narratives did intersect and that when they did not their separation was often an act of 
deliberate policy which deserves to be studied and explained rather than taken for 
granted.  Even in an era of détente largely free from the cold war crises which had 
punctuated earlier decades, European countries worked and interacted on an international 
stage which they were obliged to share with both of the superpowers and which had been 
deeply shaped by the East-West struggle.  Ignoring this fact is a step that no one writing a 
detailed history of post-war Europe’s efforts to unite can afford to take. 
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